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she also finds a strand that does not emphasize a penitential transaction or
the effortful overcoming of prior anger. Rather, it is focused on being gracious, generous, or loving. In spite of the fact that this strand has been associated with forgiveness for centuries, she dismisses it as not really being
about forgiveness. Instead, she suggests, it is about generosity. For this
move to be persuasive, one would need to show that being gracious and
being forgiving are neither a) overlapping concepts nor b) intertwined activities. And since treating them as overlapping and intertwined is both a
longstanding part of the Christian tradition and well represented in the
current philosophical literature, such a case would require rather extensive development—which Nussbaum fails to give it.
Since the arguments of the book’s later chapters depend upon the
accounts of forgiveness and anger offered in the opening chapters, the
abovementioned concerns leave two sizeable holes in the foundation of
the book’s central argument. For all I have said, it might well be possible
to fill them, but as of yet, Nussbaum has not shown how it might be done.

In Defense of Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay, by Timothy Pawl.
Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology. Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp.
272. £65.00.
ANDREW TER ERN LOKE, University of Hong Kong
Can a person possess a divine nature and a human nature, given that inconsistent predicates are true of both? This is the “Fundamental Problem”
addressed by Pawl as he attempts to defend the philosophical coherence
of the Christology put forward by the first seven ecumenical councils of
Christendom. He limits the scope of his book to considering objections
that are philosophical in nature, stating that he will not consider objections to Conciliar Christology from Biblical exegesis or from purely historical grounds (5).
After meticulously going through the contents of Conciliar Christology
in chapter 1, Pawl lays out six necessary conditions for a viable metaphysical
model of the incarnation given Conciliar Christology (48–50). Pawl goes on
to flesh out a metaphysical model, providing a helpful diagram (62) and
summary (64), and making a number of helpful clarifications such as why
a concrete (rather than abstract) view of natures should be preferred and
why the term “predication” should be preferred to “properties” (77–78).
From chapter 4 onwards Pawl provides a detailed explication of the
Fundamental Problem, comprehensively listing ten possible responses
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to this problem (94) and thoroughly analyzing these responses. One of
Pawl’s main strategies for dealing with the Fundamental Problem is to
reject what he calls “Initial Truth conditions” (e.g., “s is temporal just in
case s is inside time”; “s is atemporal just in case s is not inside time”) and
to replace them with Revised Truth Conditions (e.g., “s is temporal just in
case s has a concrete nature that is inside time”; “s is atemporal just in case
s has a concrete nature such that it is not the case that that nature is inside
time” [191]). In the rest of the book, Pawl uses this strategy to address a
variety of apparently inconsistent predicates.
This book provides a thorough analysis of the views of Conciliar
Fathers, clarifications of many problems, and rigorous arguments against
many objections and many unworkable responses to problems. I agree
that using Revised Truth Conditions involving concrete natures is a good
way to respond to many apparently inconsistent predicates with regards
to the Incarnation; a number of scholars have used similar strategies before
(see my A Kryptic Model of the Incarnation [Routledge], 96). Indeed, I agree
with Pawl on many points, but disagree with him concerning atemporality, immutability and the Two-Consciousnesses Model. As I would like
to explain my disagreement in greater detail, the disproportionate space
taken up by my explanation below might give the false impression that I
have more disagreement than agreement with Pawl.
To begin, I do not think that Pawl’s strategy can be successfully employed with regards to essential atemporality and strong immutability,
which Pawl affirms against the view of many contemporary theologians.
Pawl assumes that creating a human nature and a particular hypostatic
union does not require change (205–206). However, as he notes, the assumption that creating does not require a real change in the Creator is
controversial. It is a weakness of the book that Pawl does not cite any
literature that argues for this important assumption nor does he offer any
argument for it, merely stating that it would take him too far afield from
Christology to do so (205–206).
Pawl also utilizes the idea of “Mixed Relations,” which requires a
change only on the part of one of the relata, and he insists that “the incarnation requires no change in the divine nature, but rather the human
nature and the hypostatic union both begin to exist, and, given the nature
of the hypostatic union and what it does, the Word is incarnate” (206). But
does not the hypostatic union include the divine person, and the beginning of existence of this union involve a change in this part of the relata?
Pawl writes “When becoming incarnate, the Son took on (assumed) a
nature that was inside time. So he gained a nature” (194). But how does
“took on,” “assumed,” and “gained” not involve a change? Pawl would
agree that the union does involve the divine person, and that “the person
of the Word changes as a consequence of the incarnation” (206). However,
Pawl insists that “the divine nature does not change” (206–208); this insistence is necessary for him to claim that the Son can change yet count as
immutable according to the Revised Truth Conditions.
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Pawl’s insistence requires a distinction between divine person and divine concrete nature. Proponents of the so-called “paradox of increase”
against Concrete-nature Christology would argue that the pre-incarnate
divine nature=the Second Person of the Trinity (Robin Le Poidevin,
“Identity and the Composite Christ: an Incarnational Dilemma” Religious
Studies 45: 167–186, 178), given which Pawl’s insistence would fail. However, Pawl does not address this paradox. To respond to this paradox, one
should not argue that the divine Person is a separate concrete entity from
the divine nature, for otherwise there would be an extra concrete divine
entity. Rather, one has to concede that the divine Person is coincident with
concrete divine nature. Nevertheless, one can reply to the paradox by
arguing that the Person and concrete divine nature are distinct; this can
be argued for by applying a modified hylomorphic theory to immaterial
entities. This theory can account for why the conjoining of human nature
makes the human nature a part of the Son but not a part of the divine
concrete nature (see Loke, A Kryptic Model, §4.6.2). Nevertheless, given
the coincidence of divine person and concrete divine nature, the beginning of existence of a union involving the divine person would involve
the concrete divine nature as well, and thus also involve the latter in a
change. Therefore, the strong sense of immutability cannot be maintained.
Given that such a change involves time, essential atemporality cannot be
maintained as well.
It is significant that the examples of Mixed Relation mentioned by Pawl
(viz. “if you go from not thinking about me to thinking about me,” “if my
son, Henry, goes from being shorter than I am to being taller than me,”
and “Henry might go from being the youngest child in the family to not
being the youngest child”; 206) do not involve any sort of metaphysical
union. They are therefore disanalogous to the Incarnation. It is also significant that Pawl does not address the problematic issue of providing a
metaphysical account of the way in which only the body of Jesus belonged
to the Word, a problem raised by Merricks (“The Word Made Flesh: Dualism, Physicalism and the Incarnation,” in Persons: Human and Divine ed.
Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman [Clarendon], 2007). As argued
above, such an account of genuine metaphysical union would require the
rejection of strong immutability and essential atemporality; I provide such
an account using the Divine Preconscious Model (DPM) in Loke (A Kryptic
Model, 101–104).
Another problem with Pawl’s book concerns the number of consciousnesses and persons. Pawl affirms a Two Consciousnesses Model but insists
that there is only one person. While defending Dyothelitism Pawl supposes
the divine will sets parameters around some activities of the human will,
“similar to a parent teaching a child to walk” (220). Objectors would point
out that parent and child are two different persons.
In Loke (A Kryptic Model, 47) I argued—with reference to Mark
13:32—that on the Two Consciousnesses model the Son would have selfconsciousness SC1, “I am aware of myself being consciously aware of the
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day of my coming,” and simultaneously self-consciousness SC2, “I am
aware of myself being consciously unaware of the day of my coming.”
As “myself being consciously aware” occurs in SC1 and “myself being
consciously unaware” occurs in SC2, these two self-consciousnesses are
contradictory and therefore cannot exist in the same self simultaneously.
In response, Pawl (224) draws a distinction between a thing which is
self-conscious (the person) and the faculty in virtue of which the person
is self-conscious. He suggests that, in the Incarnation case, counting selfconsciousness by faculties in virtue of which something is self-conscious,
the number is two, while counting self-consciousness by supposita that are
conscious, the number is one. Pawl challenges the claim that SC1 and SC2
are contradictory by suggesting the following Revised Truth Conditionals:
s is consciously aware of p just in case s has a nature that has an occurrent
mental state (of the right sort) of p
s is consciously unaware of p just in case s has a nature that does not have an
occurrent mental state (of the right sort) of p.

However, such a move does not account for the first person perspective
of Christ, or his “I-thoughts.” Bayne observes that it would be possible
for Christ to think of himself (as himself) in either of his consciousnesses
(Tim Bayne, “The Inclusion Model of the Incarnation: Problems and Prospects,” Religious Studies 37: 125–141, 136). Pawl does not give an account
of how Christ would think of himself; he might reply that, given the stated
goals of the book, he does not have to explain “how” it works. However,
I would argue that consideration of first-person perspective is essential
to counting number of persons, and that this issue should not be avoided
in chapter 9 in which Pawl is attempting to reply to problems concerning the number of persons (he titled the chapter “Number Troubles”). As
Bayne points out, the first person perspective is a problem besetting the
Two Consciousnesses Model, and I have argued that consideration of first
person perspective given the Two Consciousnesses Model would imply
more than one person in Christ (Loke, A Kryptic Model, 47–48).
I have also previously argued (citing Garrett DeWeese, “One Person,
Two Natures: Two Metaphysical Models of the Incarnation,” in Jesus in
Trinitarian Perspective, ed. F. Sanders and K. Issler [B & H Academic], 2007,
133–134) that, on the Two Consciousnesses Model, the human consciousness and the divine consciousness could encounter and address each other
simultaneously, thus they could exist in a simultaneous I-Thou relationship,
which implies two persons. Pawl replies by reformulating my premise as
follows: “If the consciousness could address each other in an I-thou relationship, then Nestorianism is true” (226). He objects that the “consciousness” is not referring to the supposit, but to the nature, or faculty by which
the supposit is conscious, and since neither nature is identical to a person,
the consequent is false (226). Pawl goes on to say that “These two faculties
could be pointed at one another as the ‘thou’ of their thoughts (or, better,
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the thoughts the supposit has due to the activities they perform),” but he
denies that this entails two persons (226).
Such a response again fails to account for the first-person perspective
of Christ, or his “I-thoughts.” How would Christ think of himself then,
if he were to have two faculties which could be pointed at one another
as the “thou?” Pawl seems to have neglected the Scriptural evidences for
thinking that an I-thou relationship implies two persons. For example,
when Christ prayed “not my will but yours be done” (Mark 14:36; italics mine)—which revealed his first-person perspective—he was evidently
aware that he was not talking to himself but to another person: the Father.
Pawl notes (227) that I defined personhood following the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy : “the property of being a person has been thought to
involve various traits, including (moral) agency, reason or rationality, language or the cognitive skills language may support (such as intentionality
and self-consciousness), and the ability to enter into suitable relationship
with other persons” (662). In reply, my definition is not merely based on a
philosophy dictionary, but also on Scriptural passages such as Mark 14:36,
according to which Christ exemplifies these traits. Pawl objects: “Since,
on Conciliar Christology, the human nature of Christ, says ‘the Father is
greater than I,’ and grows in wisdom, the human nature fulfils the definition of ‘person’ that Loke is employing” (227). In reply, it is not the human
nature of Christ which does the saying; rather, it is the person of Christ
who says, in respect of his functional subordinate role, that “the Father is
greater than I.” Growing in wisdom does not imply that the human nature
has a self-consciousness of its own apart from that of Christ (indeed, on
the one-consciousness DPM, that is not the case), and hence the human
nature does not fulfil the definition of person.
In sum, the Two Consciousnesses Model is beset with the problem of
Nestorianism. The problem for Pawl is that this model seems to be the
only model of Christ’s consciousness which is consistent with essential
atemporality and strong immutability, and Pawl is committed to these
because he thinks that they are taught by the Conciliar Fathers (108–109).
However, it should be noted that the main reason why Conciliar Fathers
employed terms taken from philosophy (e.g., hypostasis) rather than
Scriptures in the first place was to use them as interpretative norms in
their attempt to ensure that the Scriptures would be understood in the
way that the Scriptural authors had intended them (Athanasius, Defence
of the Nicene Definition 5.18–24, esp. 5.21). All the talk about Christ being
atemporal and immutable qua divine was intended to convey the idea
that Christ is truly divine within a context that was deeply influenced by
Greek philosophy. Many contemporary philosophers and theologians
who are not so deeply influenced by this context would reject essential
atemporality and strong immutability. They would argue (rightly in my
view, see Loke, A Kryptic Model, chapter 4) that the Scriptures do not have
to be interpreted as affirming both of these, and that the views of Conciliar
Fathers are not binding on Christians as are the Scriptures. A Christian can
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follow the spirit rather than the letters of the Conciliar Fathers by affirming that Christ is truly divine and truly human without insisting that his
divine nature is essentially atemporal and immutable in the strong sense,
and without holding to the Two Consciousnesses Model. I am aware that
this is not how Pawl frames his project, which is to begin by supposing the
Fathers got it right in the letters of the statements, not merely the spirit.
Pawl and I agree on the spirit; however, I think that some of the letters
are indefensible in light of the objections explained above. In my view,
the one-consciousness DPM is a better model of the Incarnation which is
consistent with Scriptures and defensible against objections.

